Understanding Our Judicial Metrics

At Scrutinize, we believe in transparency and accountability in the judicial system. Our metrics are designed to provide insight into judges’ decision-making patterns and their impacts.

While Scrutinize’s metrics provide valuable insights, they should be considered as part of a comprehensive evaluation of a judge’s performance. We encourage users to read the full reports and context for each metric to gain a more complete understanding of a judge’s record.

If you notice an error or have additional information to share, we welcome your input—please contact us.

Here’s what you need to know about each metric.

Judge Background & Service Information

What it is: Basic information about each judge, including their name, court, county, method of selection (appointment or election), and term dates.

Why it’s relevant: This foundational information provides the context necessary to understand a judge’s jurisdiction, role, and time on the bench. It also helps users interpret other metrics in light of when and where the judge served.

Dataset details: Synthesized from the New York State Unified Court System’s Judicial Directory, disclosures provided by the Office of Court Administration in response to a Freedom of Information request, and supplemented by independent research. Both the Judicial Directory and the OCA data contain inaccuracies; Scrutinize has corrected these errors whenever identified.

Publication Rate

What it is: The average number of a judge’s written decisions per year that appeared in New York’s free, online State Reporter database. This is not the percentage of a judge’s work that is published (we don’t know the total number of written decisions a judge produces); it’s about what is transparent and available to New Yorkers because it is published in a free database.

Why it’s relevant: This metric quantifies the transparency of a judge’s work and helps assess the public’s ability to review their judicial decisions.

In New York, judges have discretion over whether to publish their decisions in a state database. This choice directly impacts the transparency of their work and the public’s ability to assess their judicial reasoning. A higher publication rate indicates a judge who more frequently makes their decisions available for public scrutiny. This transparency is crucial for accountability, as it allows the public, researchers, and other stakeholders to review and analyze the judge’s legal reasoning and decision-making patterns. It also provides valuable insights for attorneys preparing cases and for individuals seeking to understand how laws are interpreted and applied.

Ranking: Based on current judges with at least one year on the bench during the dataset window (2013 through the last full calendar year). Rates are expressed as decisions per year.

Dataset details: 2013 through the last full calendar year. The publication rate only includes decisions accessible through the Law Reporting Bureau’s free online State Reporter database; it does not include decisions available through NYSCEF/e-filing or decisions available only through paid legal databases.

Further reading: Open Criminal Courts, a report by Scrutinize and Reinvent Albany.

Suppression Reversal Rate

What it is: The share of suppression-related appeals from a judge’s cases in which the appellate court reversed the judge’s denial of suppression, holding that the evidence should have been excluded on constitutional grounds.

Why it’s relevant: When police obtain evidence in violation of constitutional rights—for instance, by searching someone’s home without a warrant—judges must decide whether to “suppress” (exclude) that evidence from trial. Appellate courts rarely overturn these rulings, showing great deference to trial judges’ assessments of police testimony and factual findings. Therefore, when appellate judges do reverse a suppression ruling, it indicates that the judge erred by failing to protect the defendant’s constitutional rights.

The suppression reversal rate is calculated by dividing the number of times appellate courts reversed the judge’s denial of suppression by the total number of appeals from that judge’s cases in which suppression issues were discussed. To find this denominator, we search all criminal appellate decisions for words indicating suppression.

Ranking: Based on current trial-level judges with at least one appeal in our dataset where suppression issues were discussed (i.e., a nonzero denominator).

Dataset details: 2007 through the last full calendar year.

Further reading: Unprotected, a report by Scrutinize.

Excessive Sentences & Reductions

What it is: The number of times appellate courts have found a judge’s sentence “excessive” or “unduly harsh” and the total years they have removed from those sentences. This metric only measures sentence reductions after trial; it excludes reductions following guilty pleas.

Why it’s relevant: These rare findings, made by panels of 2-5 appellate judges, indicate that the judge was unusually severe in their sentencing decisions.

Excessive sentences are a clear signal from higher courts that a lower court judge’s sentencing decision was exceptionally punitive. When an appellate court reduces a sentence “in the interest of justice,” it’s effectively overriding the lower court judge’s discretion, indicating that the original sentence was unreasonably harsh given the circumstances of the case.

These findings are particularly significant because they are rare. Appellate courts generally defer to lower court judges on sentencing matters, recognizing their firsthand knowledge of the case details. Therefore, when an appellate court does intervene to reduce a sentence, it suggests a substantial deviation from typical sentencing practices. Multiple excessive sentence findings for a single judge may indicate a pattern of overly punitive sentencing that warrants closer scrutiny.

Beyond the number of findings, the total years reduced provides further context. Some excessive sentences may be reduced only slightly, while others result in dramatic cuts to incarceration time. This metric quantifies the real-world impact of appellate intervention by tracking how many years of incarceration were eliminated from a judge’s sentences.

Ranking: Previously, we included judges in this metric based on a combination of appellate decisions naming them, their publication of criminal trial decisions, and judicial directory records showing service in criminal court. As of 2026, we’ve updated the inclusion criteria so that only judges who had at least one criminal case go to appeal during the years covered by our dataset are included. Because of this update, some judges who previously appeared in this metric may no longer be listed.

Dataset details: 2007 through the last full calendar year.

Further reading: Excessive Sentencers, a report by Scrutinize and The Center on Race, Inequality, and the Law at NYU School of Law.

Reassigned Reversals

What it is: The number of cases where appellate courts not only overturned a criminal case but also reassigned it to a different judge.

Why it’s relevant: These extremely rare cases may indicate judicial impropriety, such as bias or prejudicial conduct.

Reversal and reassignment is an extraordinary action taken by appellate courts. While reversals are rare, the additional step of reassigning a case to a different judge is significantly rarer. This action suggests that the appellate court has identified issues that go beyond mere legal errors or differences in interpretation.

Reasons for reassignment can vary but often involve concerns about the judge’s impartiality, bias, or conduct during the proceedings. Examples might include a judge making inappropriate comments, showing clear bias against a party, or failing to follow proper procedures in a way that compromises fairness. Even a single instance of reversal and reassignment is noteworthy and warrants close examination. Multiple instances may suggest more systemic issues with a judge’s conduct or decision-making process.

Ranking: Previously, we included judges in this metric based on a combination of appellate decisions naming them, their publication of criminal trial decisions, and judicial directory records showing service in criminal court. As of 2026, we’ve updated the inclusion criteria so that only judges who had at least one criminal case go to appeal during the years covered by our dataset are included. Because of this update, some judges who previously appeared in this metric may no longer be listed.

Dataset details: 2007 through the last full calendar year.

Further reading: Reverse & Reassign, a report by Scrutinize.

Blocked Affordable Bail & Favored Commercial Bonds

What it is: A measure of whether judges are setting affordable bail and reducing reliance on the commercial bail industry, as mandated by New York law.

Why it’s relevant: The 2019 bail reform law aimed to ensure that defendants could access affordable bail options and limit reliance on the commercial bail industry. The law sought to address disparities where wealthier defendants could buy their way out of pretrial detention, while low-income defendants were disproportionately detained simply because they could not afford to pay.

This metric evaluates whether judges are implementing bail reform in line with its legislative intent by looking at upfront cost across three common monetary-bail options: cash bail, a commercial (insurance-company) bond, and a Partially Secured Surety Bond (PSSB).

We track two related rates:

For these comparisons, we treat the upfront payment as: cash bail = the cash-bail amount, PSSB = the required deposit, and commercial bond = the nonrefundable premium (fee).

  • Blocked Affordable Bail: Cases where the upfront deposit required for a PSSB was not the lowest-upfront-payment option among the three forms (i.e., it was equal to or higher than at least one of the other two options). We calculate the required PSSB deposit using the percentage recorded in the OCA data (often 10%).
  • Favored Commercial Bonds: Cases where the upfront commercial-bond cost was strictly the lowest-upfront-payment option among the three forms. We estimate this cost as the standard nonrefundable bond premium based on the bond amount.

How we calculate the rates: Starting in 2026 (with the 2025 data update), we changed how we calculate these rates. In earlier versions (and in our Setting Bail to Fail report), we reported the percentage out of all monetary-bail cases a judge handled, including cases where the judge set bail forms beyond cash bail, commercial bond, and PSSB. This is why the report described results as “at least” rates — minimums that are definitely true across all monetary-bail cases.

Starting in 2026, we calculate the percentage using only cases where the judge set cash bail, a commercial bond, and a PSSB, each set at more than $0, with no other forms of bail set. We made this change because Judicial Profiles are mainly used to compare judges, and this updated approach produces a percentage that is based on the same type of cases for each judge. Because this update changes which cases are included, you may see judges’ percentages change compared to earlier versions.

Ranking: A judge must have at least 25 cases that meet the criteria above to be listed under this metric.

Dataset details: Based on New York judges who appeared in monetary-bail cases captured in the Office of Court Administration pretrial data from January 2020 through June 2025.

Further reading: Setting Bail to Fail, a report by Scrutinize and the Zimroth Center at NYU School of Law.

Disproportionate Carcerality

What it is: An estimate of how much additional pretrial detention time is associated with a judge’s detention decisions, compared to peer judges handling similar cases (accounting for factors like charge severity and prior record).

Why it’s relevant: Pretrial detention can have significant impacts. Research has linked pretrial detention with increased recidivism rates, exacerbated racial disparities, and influence over case outcomes.

This metric estimates the additional pretrial detention time associated with a judge’s detention decisions compared to peer judges in similar cases, after accounting for factors like charge severity and prior record. The value is reported as estimated additional years of detention during the study period (not a percentage).

Ranking: Based on the 245 New York City judges who appeared in bail-eligible arraignments between January 2020 and June 2022.

Dataset details: January 2020 to June 2022. Only uses data from New York City.

Further reading: Cost of Discretion, a report by Scrutinize, the Zimroth Center at NYU School of Law, and QSIDE Institute.

Public Discipline

What it is: A record of public disciplinary actions, including admonitions and censures, issued by the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct against a judge.

Why it’s relevant: The Commission is the official state body tasked with investigating judicial misconduct and imposing disciplinary measures when appropriate. Given the rarity of public disciplinary determinations, they are a strong indicator of ethical violations or misconduct.

However, this metric requires careful interpretation. The absence of public discipline does not imply flawless conduct, as the Commission can and does resolve complaints with private warnings that are not disclosed to the public.

Furthermore, the details of a judge’s underlying conduct often highlight concerns that may not be fully reflected by the formal sanction (e.g., admonition or censure).

For these reasons, we strongly encourage readers to review the full text of any public disciplinary determinations, which are linked in each judge’s profile.

Ranking: Based on all judges in New York State with public admonitions or censures.

Dataset details: Includes all public admonitions and censures from 2000 through the last full calendar year. Does not include removals or negotiated resignations, as those judges are no longer on the bench.

Further reading: New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct.